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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work by Mitchell (1927), considerable e¤ort has been devoted to ex-
amine non-linearities in macroeconomic time series. Graham (1930), Keynes (1936) and
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have then stimulated a vast debate on the asymmetric
e¤ects of monetary policy. Widespread empirical evidence has been produced in sup-
port of the view that monetary policy exerts asymmetric e¤ects on output and prices
with respect to the economic conditions as well as the direction and size of the policy
action. Such e¤ects have important implications not only for the way we think about the
macroeconomy, but also for the conduct of economic policy.
Lo and Piger (2005) account for di¤erent forms of asymmetry in the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. According to their empirical analysis, the most pervasive form of
non-linearity is represented by the asymmetric transmission of monetary policy over con-
tractions and expansions in the business cycle. In this respect, the econometric evidence
available to date has mostly focused on the state-dependent responsiveness of output
and ination, reporting two coexisting regularities (see also Weise, 1999 and Peersman
and Smets, 2005). On one hand, monetary policy innovations have greater impact on
output during contractions. On the other hand, changes in the monetary policy stance
do not induce statistically di¤erent responses of prices during di¤erent cyclical phases.
Our objective is to provide a parsimonious explanation of these facts. To that e¤ect,
we rst document some asymmetries in the cyclical behavior of key macroeconomic vari-
ables, as well as their responses to monetary policy shocks. We then present a tractable
macroeconomic model in which households display reference-dependent preferences of the
type popularized by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as prospect theory. The modeling
strategy consists of assuming that householdsutility partly depends on the deviation of
their consumption from a habit-based reference level of consumption below which loss
aversion is displayed. In line with the key tenet of prospect theory, losses in consumption
utility resonate more than gains.
The behavioral mechanism underlying loss-averse preferences has found wide empirical
and experimental support in the literature (Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz,
1997). Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) show that
prospect theory may help to explain the behavior of asset returns and resolve a num-
ber of quantitative asset pricing puzzles. Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2009) assume that
households care about gains and losses in consumption, a hypothesis that nds empirical
support in Yogo (2008) and Rosenblatt-Wisch (2008). However, none of these approaches
takes the analysis to a general equilibrium perspective.1 The novelty of this paper is to
embed prospect theory in a dynamic general equilibrium framework and focus on the
1So far little e¤ort has been made to explore the relevance of prospect theory for the dynamics
of macroeconomic aggregates. Some applications to price-setting (Heidhues and Koszegi, 2005) and
consumption theory (Bowman et al., 1999 and Koszegi and Rabin, 2009) have been proposed.
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transmission of monetary policy to output and ination. In this respect, two key mech-
anisms are characterized. First, during contractions changes in the real rate of interest
exert stronger impact on output through an increased elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution between current and future consumption. This feature has been extensively
examined in the literature on asset pricing (Yogo, 2008). Second, embedding loss-averse
preferences in a general equilibrium setting implies a state-dependent marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure that can be related to rmsreal marginal
cost, so as to impose the labor market equilibrium. The labor supply schedule retains
the key property of being atter below the reference point, so that real wages feature
downward stickiness in contractions. Both features of the model are compatible with
output being more adversely a¤ected by monetary policy innovations during contrac-
tions. Concurrently, ination responses are attenuated through an increased degree of
real rigidity in the labor market. As a result, no di¤erence can be appreciated between in-
ation responses over di¤erent cyclical phases. State-dependent degrees of intertemporal
substitutability in consumption and intratemporal substitutability between consumption
and leisure induce relevant non-linearities with respect to the economic conditions as well
as the direction of the policy action. The model predicts stronger output responses when
monetary policy is restrictive, as compared with expansive policy actions, while ina-
tion displays nearly symmetric responses to monetary shocks with opposite signs.2 In
addition, the cyclical movements of real activity as implied by the model are manifestly
asymmetric, with statistical evidence of both deepness(troughs are deeper than peaks
are tall) and steepness(contractions are steeper than expansions).3
It is important to acknowledge that the macroeconomic literature has proposed a vari-
ety of mechanisms acting from both the supply and the demand side of the economy and
capable to take account of di¤erent forms of non-linearity.4 For instance, Peersman and
Smets (2005) suggest that the nancial accelerator theory may explain why the e¤ects
of money on output are stronger in contractions. However, this mechanism implies an
analogous amplication (attenuation) of monetary policy innovations on both prices and
real activity during contractions (expansions). To overcome such a discrepancy with the
existing empirical evidence, the balance-sheet channel needs to be complemented with
a mechanism capable of producing competing e¤ects on prices, so as to obtain the de-
2These properties are in line with the evidence reported by Cover (1992), Morgan (1993), Karras and
Stokes (1999), Weise (1999) and Dufrenot, Mignon, and Peguin-Feissolle (2004).
3These features have been extensively documented, among others, by Neftci (1984), Hamilton (1989),
Sichel (1993) and, more recently, Morley and Piger (2012).
4The list of mechanisms that may give rise to asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism
includes: non-linearities in investment (Bertola and Caballero, 1994), patterns of entry and exit from a
given market under uncertainty about prot perspectives (Dixit, 1989), nominal rigidities in the labor
and the goods market (Ball and Mankiw, 1994), learning and information aggregation (Chalkley and
Lee, 1998), state-dependent pricing and convex aggregate supply (Devereux and Siu, 2007). However,
none of these mechanisms is per se capable to take account of cyclical asymmetries in the joint reaction
of output and prices to monetary policy innovations.
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sired non-linearity in the response of output, while generating symmetric price responses.
In this respect, models with inverse L-shapedor convex aggregate supply curves that
belong to the Keynesian tradition are plausible candidates. A convex aggregate sup-
ply retains the property to be steeper for price levels above expected prices (see, e.g.,
Ball and Mankiw, 1994), so that it ensures a stronger (lower) reaction of output (prices)
in contraction. Therefore, reconciling the macroeconomic theory with the evidence of
no asymmetry in the response of prices typically calls for the coexistence of multiple
driving forces. This paper provides an alternative explanation based on a simple and
well-established behavioral mechanism.
Once it is recognized that loss aversion induces various types of asymmetry in the
transmission of shocks to the economy, it seems relevant to provide some guidance as
to how monetary policy should be designed to cope with such non-linearities. To this
end, we derive the optimal monetary policy from the perspective of the Ramsey planner.
In this context, the policy maker faces a non-trivial trade-o¤, as she needs to weigh
the distortion stemming from price rigidity with the one induced by external habits in
consumption. In fact, with only one policy instrument available the Central Bank cannot
simultaneously ensure that output is at its e¢ cient level and ination is eliminated.
The resulting policy is state-dependent and, due to loss averse preferences, it imposes
the policy maker to attach greater importance to the consumption externality during
contractions as compared with expansions.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 documents some evidence
on a range of asymmetries that are consistent with the non-linear mechanisms that char-
acterize the model we put forward; Section 3 presents the theoretical framework; Section
4 details the model solution technique; Section 5 discusses the key mechanisms that gen-
erate non-linear responses of output and ination to monetary innovations; Section 6
discusses the normative implications of embedding loss-averse consumption preferences
in a general equilibrium setting; the last section concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
There is widespread evidence that monetary policy shocks exert a di¤erent impact on
macroeconomic aggregates over di¤erent stages of the business cycle.5 Prior to providing a
theoretical explanation to these ndings, we add to the existing evidence by documenting
cyclical asymmetries in the behavior of some macroeconomic variables that assume a
central role in the theoretical framework we design. In this respect, it is important to
stress that most of the empirical studies available to date have focused on the state-
dependent responsiveness of output and ination. We enlarge the picture by exploring
5See, e.g., Weise (1999), Peersman and Smets (2005) and Lo and Piger (2005).
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the cyclical behavior of real wages.6
2.1 Asymmetries in the Transmission of Monetary Policy
The responses of key variables to monetary policy shocks are computed over di¤erent
phases of the business cycle. Specically, contractions (expansions) are intended as peri-
ods in which the cycle moves from its peak (trough) to the trough (peak).7 The mone-
tary policy unforecasted innovations are taken from Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Silvia, and
Kueng (2012), who have extended the time series of shocks originally obtained by Romer
and Romer (2004). In order to identify the transmission of these shocks to the output
gap, ination, the real wage and the monetary policy instrument, the projection method
proposed by Jorda (2005) is employed. This can easily accommodate non-linearities in
the data and has the advantage of not imposing the dynamic restrictions implicitly em-
bedded in standard VARs. We run a series of single-equation regressions, one for each of
the four variables of interest, which are generically denoted by xt:
xt+h = d
0
tch +

aEh (L)xt 1 + 
E
h t

[1  F (zt)] +

aCh (L)xt 1 + 
C
h t

F (zt) + "t;
where dt is a vector of deterministic covariates (including a constant and, whenever nec-
essary, a linear and a quadratic trend),8 while aih (L) is a polynominal in the lag operator
(with i = fE;Cg, where E stands for Expansion and C stands for Contraction).9
Expansions (contractions) are traditionally identied as a periods of positive (negative)
growth of a smooth indicator of the level of the economic activity. This indicator is
denoted by yst . Following Granger and Terasvirta (1993), a logistic transformation of
zt  yst is then applied: F (zt) = exp ( {zt) [1 + exp ( {zt)] 1. This can be thought
of as a measure of the likelihood of being in a contraction, with { measuring how quickly
the economy switches from a contraction to an expansion (and vice versa). The monetary
policy shock is denoted by t. Therefore, the coe¢ cient 
E
h (
C
h ) captures the average
e¤ect of a monetary policy innovation on a specic series of interest during expansions
(contractions) and at a specic horizon h.
Quarterly time series data over the 1982:Q3-2008:Q4 period have been selected.10
6It should also be noted that most of the recent studies exploring cyclical asymmetries in the labor
market are silent about the role of real and nominal wages, while just focusing on the non-linear behavior
of hours and employment.
7Zarnowitz (1992) refers to these cyclical phases as growth cycles.
8Specically, we allow for a linear and a quadratic trend when dealing with the real wage. Otherwise,
we only include a constant.
9The baseline specication includes two lags for each variable. The evidence we report is robust to
including more lags, as well as to considering a regime-specic coe¢ cient for the deterministic component.
10The start date is warranted by vast empirical evidence documenting marked di¤erences in the conduct
of monetary policy between the pre- and post-Volcker era (e.g., Clarida et al., 2000, Castelnuovo and
Surico, 2010). The end date is chosen so as to exclude the period in which the policy rate has reached
the zero lower bound.
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Focusing on this time window allows us to exclude the great ination of the 1970s, thus
insulating the analysis from an important monetary policy regime change. The output
gap is computed as the (log) di¤erence between the real GDP and the potential level of
output calculated by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO hereafter). Ination is the
quarter-to-quarter change in the logarithm of the GDP deator. The real wage is proxied
by the real compensation per hour in the Nonfarm Business Sector. The monetary policy
instrument is proxied by the Federal Funds rate.
Insert Figure 1 here
Figure 1 graphs the impulse response functions from our regression exercise.11 The
monetary policy shock results into a transitory increase in the Federal Funds rate which
is not substantially di¤erent across opposite stages of the cycle. By contrast, we appreci-
ate a more pronounced response of the output gap during contractions, thus conrming
the evidence reported by previous studies.12 What is perhaps more surprising is that,
compared with the output gap responses, both ination and the real wage do not dis-
play marked asymmetries, as the condence intervals of their responses tend to overlap.
Therefore, both series are somewhat insulated by the stronger reactiveness of the output
gap during contractions. This nding is incompatible with the mechanism underlying
the standard formulation of a model economy with nominal frictions. In fact a linear
New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC hereafter) implies that, holding constant future
expectations, output gap changes should linearly transmit to ination dynamics through
their equilibrium relationship with the real wage. Taken together, the responses of the
output gap and the real wage point to the presence labor market asymmetries. Section
3 presents a framework that may help to rationalize these facts. One of its peculiarities
is to generate a lower slope of the NKPC in contractions, due to an endogenous form of
real wage rigidity. The next two subsections support the empirical plausibility of these
non-linearities and discuss the empirical literature that has addressed them in the past.
2.2 Asymmetries in the Slope of the Phillips Curve
Daly and Hobijn (2013) have recently shown that the Phillips curve (PC hereafter) has
attened during all the recession episodes taking place over the 1986-2012 time window.13
11For robustness purposes Section A in the online appendix replicates this gure under alternative
denitions of the business cycle turning points.
12Tenreyro and Thwaites (2013) have recently shown that monetary policy shocks tend to have greater
e¤ects in expansions than in recessions. However, their analysis di¤ers from ours in a number of respects.
First and foremost, while we focus on phases of acceleration/deceleration in the cycle (i.e., "growth cy-
cles"), they account for situations in which real activity is above/below potential (i.e., "classical cycles").
In addition, their sample includes the Volcker disination, while we exclude it so as to avoid accounting
for a major regime change (Goodfriend and King, 2005; Sims and Zha, 2006).
13Laxton, Clark, and Rose (1996) and Debelle and Laxton (1997) represent some earlier examples of
empirical works supporting the convexity of the PC.
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In this subsection further evidence is provided in support of the inherent non-linearity
of the supply schedule, showing how this attens during the contractionary episodes. In
doing so, we follow the approach pursued by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013), running
some (reduced form) expectations-augmented PC regressions:
t   Ett+1 = 0 + 1yt + 2F (zt) yt + ut; (1)
where t is the rate of ination, Ett+1 denotes expectations of ination and yt is the
output gap. A negative estimate of 2 would support the PC becoming atter during con-
tractions. Once again, the 1982:Q3-2008:Q4 period is examined, with ination measured
by the GDP deator and yt measured by the CBO output gap. Two proxies for ination
expectations are considered: (i) rst, forward looking expectations are obtained from
the survey of professional forecasters (SPF); (ii) second, a backward looking measure of
ination expectations is computed as an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA
hereafter) of past ination, as advocated by Cogley (2002).14 Table 1 reports both OLS
and IV estimates.15
Insert Table 1 here
Both estimators lead to very similar results. However, the coe¢ cient attached to the
output gap is slightly larger when using the EWMA measure of ination expectations,
as compared with the estimates obtained by employing the SPF forecast. What we nd
more relevant for the sake of our analysis is that the interaction terms always enter with
a negative sign. Furthermore, the estimated 2 turns out to be statistically di¤erent from
zero across all specications.16 Altogether, these facts point to the possibility that the PC
attens during contractions. As such, this nding provides an alternative interpretation
of the evidence reported by Ball and Mazumder (2011) on the missing deation during
the Great Recession. The next subsection reports evidence supporting the view that such
non-linearity may stem from real wage asymmetries.
2.3 Real Wage Asymmetries
Recent years have borne witness to a growing literature supporting the hypothesis that
real wages encounter some resistance to adjusting in the face of shocks to the economy.
Using a survey of US rms, Holzer and Montgomery (1993) lend support to this view,
14In the computation of this proxy we follow Cogley (2002) and set the smoothing parameter to 0.125.
However, the results are robust to sensible departures from this value.
15In the second case we use a lag of the output gap and the interaction term as instruments.
16Laxton, Rose, and Tambakis (1999) warn on the di¢ culty to identify convexities if policymakers are
successful in avoiding large boom and bust cycles, as in the sample we look at. In light of this, one
should interpret evidence in support of the PC asymmetry as potentially being downward biased during
the Great Moderation period we examine.
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showing that wage adjustments are fairly small, compared with employment adjustments.
Most importantly, wage changes are asymmetric, with signicant adjustments in response
to positive demand shifts, but not negative shifts. Also Dickens et al. (2007) document
wage-setting asymmetries for a number of countries, using data from the International
Wage Flexibility Project. Their results support both nominal and real downward wage
rigidities. While the former appears relatively more important for the US, both forms
of rigidity are necessary to match the cross-sectional distribution of wages. A number
of other studies deliver evidence in support of downward real wage rigidity, using large
panels of OECD countries (e.g., Fabiani et al., 2006; Bauer et al., 2007; Du Caju et al.,
2009; Messina et al., 2009, 2010; Babecky et al., 2010).17 Along with this substantial
body of empirical evidence based on micro data, we also nd contributions that reach
similar conclusions by examining experimental data (e.g., Goette et al., 2004 and Farber,
2008), industry-level data (Holden and Wulfsberg, 2009) and macro data (Benigno et al.,
2012).
To illustrate the behavior of the real wage over di¤erent phases of the cycle, Figure
2 graphs the cumulative log-deviation of the real wage and output from their trend at
di¤erent turning points in the sample under examination. Abbritti and Fahr (2013)
produce similar evidence though their focus is restricted to recessionary episodes and
document a fundamental disconnection between employment and the real wage. We show
that similar evidence emerges after a peak in the cycle. Only the contraction including
the 2001 recession is associated with a drop in the detrended real wage,18 whereas in the
other two contractionary episodes this variable tends to remain positive, notwithstanding
a negative output gap. Further evidence in support of the view that real wages nd it
harder to adjust in a downturn comes from observing the correlation between annualized
changes in the real wage and labor productivity. As a matter of fact, this is greater in
expansions (0.26), as compared with contractions (0.17).19
Insert Figure 2 here
3 A Model of Loss-averse Consumption
This section sets out the structure of the model we use to explain asymmetries in the
responses of output and prices to monetary innovations. The supply side is populated by
monopolistically competitive rms that produce intermediate goods, indexed by j 2 [0; 1],
and a perfectly competitive sector of production that sells a composite of consumption
17Along with these studies, there are works that rely on surveys of managers and rm owners (e.g.,
Bewley, 1999 and Agell and Lundborg, 2003).
18Also Abbritti and Fahr (2013) appreciate this fact.
19Analogous considerations can be made when looking at alternative measures of productivity, such
as the TFP (0.24 vs. 0.11) and the utilization-adjusted TFP (0.25 vs. 0.13).
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goods. As to the demand side, there is a continuum of atomistic consumers, indexed by
i 2 [0; 1].
3.1 Demand Side
Households have preferences dened over leisure (1  Nit), consumption (Cit) and gains
and losses in consumption relative to its reference level (Xit). They maximize the expected
present discounted value of their utility:
Wit = Et
1X
s=0
s
"
U (Cit+s; Xit+s)  N
1+
it+s
1 + 
#
;  > 0; (2)
where  is the intertemporal discount factor and  is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006) and Yogo (2008), a general class of
reference-dependent preferences is considered:20
U (C;X) = V (C) + (1  )G (V (C)  V (X)) ;  2 [0; 1] ; (3)
where V (C) is a neoclassical utility function: this is assumed to be continuously di¤er-
entiable, strictly increasing, and concave for all C > 0. The term G () is a gain-loss
function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), that is, utility derived from the deviation of
consumption utility from its reference level, V (X). Preferences that depend on a reference
level of consumption have psychological foundations in hedonic adaptation (see Frederick
and Loewenstein, 1999). We assume that G () satises certain properties. Specically:
(i) G (Z) is continuous for all Z 0s, twice di¤erentiable for Z 6= 0 and G (0) = 0; (ii)
G (Z) is strictly increasing; (iii)  G ( Z) > G (Z) and G0 ( Z) > G0 (Z), 8Z > 0; (iv)
G
00
(Z)  0 for Z > 0 and G00 (Z)  0 for Z < 0. Properties (i) and (ii) imply monotonic-
ity, i.e. utility is strictly increasing in the magnitude of the gain. Property (iii) embodies
the notion of loss aversion, i.e. the impact of a loss is greater than that of an equally-sized
gain. This implies that the representative consumer becomes more sensitive to deviations
from her relative consumption when she is in a bad state, compared with a good state.
Finally, property (iv) is referred to as diminishing sensitivity, i.e. the marginal e¤ect of
a gain or a loss diminishes with its magnitude. Specically, a strong form of diminishing
sensitivity will be imposed. This amounts to assume that the curvature of the gain-loss
function approaches zero as Z ! 1.21
20For the time being, and without loss of generality, we introduce reference-dependent preferences by
reporting the relevant variables without time subscripts.
21As remarked by Yogo (2008), this specication allows us to think about both risk aversion and loss
aversion. Risk aversion refers to the curvature of consumption utility, which determines the households
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To take account of these properties, an exponential gain-loss utility is considered
(Köbberling and Wakker, 2005):
G (Z) =
8>><>>:
1 exp( Z)

i¤ Z  0
  [1 exp(


Z)]

otherwise
;   0;  > 1; (4)
where  governs diminishing sensitivity and  is a parameter that indexes the degree of
loss aversion. Note that for  = 0 a linear gain-loss function is obtained. Otherwise,
(4) retains the property to be smooth at the reference point.22 To gain further intuition
on the structure of reference-dependent preferences over consumption, Figure 3 plots the
exponential gain-loss function and its rst order derivative for di¤erent values of Z (x-
axis) and . As predicted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), loss aversion reects the
widely observed behavior that agents are more sensitive to losses than gains, resulting in
a gain-loss function that is steeper in the rst case (see the left-hand panel of Figure 3).
Moreover, the right-hand panel of Figure 3 captures the essence of diminishing sensitivity
in consumer preferences, according to which marginal departures from the reference point
are more (less) important the less (more) away they are from it.
Insert Figure 3 here
As to the reference consumption level, it is assumed that consumers evaluate the
distance between consumption utility and a function of the average consumption in the
previous period: Xit = C

t 1, where  2 [0; 1] indexes the importance of external habit
formation.23 ;24
The ith consumer, whose labor is remunerated at the real wage Wt, enters period t
with Bit 1 one-period nominal bonds that pay Rt 1(= 1 + it 1) gross interest. Moreover,
behavior for large gambles. Loss aversion refers to the magnitude of marginal utility for losses relative
to gains, which determines the households behavior for small gambles. Tversky and Kahneman (1991)
extend their treatment of choice under uncertainty (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) to the
problem of facing a riskless choice.
22This property is particularly useful in the perspective of linearizing the model economy.
23Gill and Prowse (2012) report experimental evidence that supports the role of endogenous choice-
acclimating reference points in economic decisions. In the present context external habits allow us to
establish a direct link between the empirical evidence on the transmission of monetary policy during
contractionary/expansionary phases of the cycle and the state-dependent model we build up. In prin-
ciple, internal habit formation could have been considered. However, along with being computationally
prohibitive, such a modelling option would lead to no specic insight into the problem under examination.
24In line with Yogo (2008), we embed external habit formation in a model of reference-dependent
consumption preferences. Since the work of Abel (1990), external habit formation has become known as
catching up with the Joneses. External habit formation in consumption is usually introduced to account
for the empirical persistence in the consumption process (Smets and Wouters, 2007). Unlike internal
habit formation, this mechanism implies that households fail to internalize the externality of their own
consumption on the utility of other households.
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she pays a lump sum tax Tit to the government and receives the ow of dividends from
a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers, Dit:
PtCit +Bit  Rt 1Bit 1 + PtWtNit +Dit   Tit; (5)
where Pt is the nominal price level, Dit =
1Z
0
Dijtdj and Dijt denotes the dividends of rm
j paid to the ith household.
Di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to individual consumption (Cit) and tak-
ing the consumption reference level as external to the ith household returns the following
Euler equation:
1 = Et
(
Rt
t+1
UC
 
Cit+1; Xit+1j it+1

UC (Cit; Xitj it)
)
; (6)
where t  1 + t denotes the gross rate of ination and it+1 is a discrete valued
random variable that equals one if consumption utility is above its reference level (i.e.,
V (Cit)  V (Xit)) and zero otherwise. Therefore, the marginal utility of consumption
depends on the gain-loss prole and its shape changes depending on whether consumption
is above or below the reference level.
The expected marginal rate of substitution between Cit and Nit reads as:
Nit
UC (Cit; Xitj it)
= Wt. (7)
Equations (6) and (7) are key to understanding how cyclical asymmetries in the trans-
mission of monetary policy may arise in our model. Equation (6) regulates intertemporal
substitution between current and future consumption. A closer look at this relationship
allows us to provide some intuition on the key mechanism governing consumption dy-
namics. The curvature of the gain-loss function is lower when consumption is below its
reference level, implying higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution during negative
growth cycles. Concurrently, equation (7) governs the intratemporal substitution between
consumption and leisure. For a given jV (C)  V (X)j, households are more willing to
cut on their leisure when consumption utility lies below its reference level. This implies
a atter labor supply schedule, ceteris paribus. Section 5.1 details the key implications
of this feature for the labor market equilibrium.
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3.2 Supply Side
The supply side of the model conforms to the standard treatment of frameworks with
nominal price rigidities. The nal good is produced by perfectly competitive rms and
requires the assembly of a continuum of intermediate goods via the following technology:
Yt =
R 1
0
(Yjt)
" 1
" dj
 "
" 1
, where " denotes the elasticity of substitution between di¤er-
entiated goods in the production composite. Prot maximization leads to the demand
function Yjt = (Pjt=Pt)
 " Yt for the jth type of good, where Pjt denotes its price. Thus,
Pt =
R 1
0
(Pjt)
1 " dj
 1
1 "
is the price index consistent with the nal good producer earning
null prots.
Each rm in the intermediate goods sector produces a unique good using only labor
as input according to Yjt = ZtNjt, where Zt is the total factor productivity. Firms choose
the amount of labor that minimizes the cost of production. The resulting real marginal
cost is 
t = Wt=Zt. Following Rotemberg (1982), we allow for sluggish nominal price
adjustment by assuming that rms face a quadratic resource cost for adjusting prices:
'
2
(Pj;t=Pj;t 1   1)2 Yt, '  0.
The Lagrangian representation of the rms problem is:
max
Pj;t+s
Et
1X
s=0
Mt;t+sYt+s
"
(1 + )

Pjt+s
Pt+s
1 "
  
t+s

Pjt+s
Pt+s
 "
  '
2
(j;t+s   1)2
#
, (8)
whereMt;t+s  s UC(Ct+s;Xt+sjt+s)UC(Ct;Xtjt) is the stochastic discount factor,  is a subsidy received
from the government (this is nanced by the lump-sum taxes on the household) and
j;t+s  Pj;t+s=Pj;t 1+s. Firms can change their price in each period, subject to the
adjustment cost. They all face the same problem, ultimately setting the same price
and employing the same amount of labor, so that the aggregate production function is
Yt = ZtNt. Therefore, we retrieve the following rst order condition:
(1 + ) (1  ") + "
t   ' (t   1) t + 'Et

Mt;t+1 (t+1   1) t+1Yt+1
Yt

= 0. (9)
In turn, (9) gives rise to the conventional NKPC, according to which current ination
depends on the discounted sum of current and expected future real marginal costs.
Finally, the market clearing condition accounts for the price adjustment cost, so that
Yt = Ct +
'
2
(t   1)2 Yt.
3.3 Government
The government consists of two authorities. First, there is a monetary authority which
controls the nominal interest rate on short-term nominal bonds through open market
operations. Since we deal with a cashless economy, seigniorage revenue is not considered,
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as open market operations are implicitly assumed to be innitesimally small. Second,
there is a scal authority that collects lump sum taxes from households and rebates them
to rms as production subsidies. There is no government spending per se. For the time
being, we assume that the Central Bank implements a standard instrument rule:25
Rt
R
=

t

r
exp (t) ; (10)
where t captures non-systematic monetary policy responses.
26 Assuming a symmetric
policy function to stabilize ination represents a convenient way to close the model and
focus on the e¤ects of introducing reference-dependent preferences into an otherwise stan-
dard framework. Section 6 departs from this hypothesis and examines optimal monetary
policy-making from the perspective of the Ramsey planner.
4 Model Solution
In the framework set out above householdsutility is reference-dependent, i.e. its func-
tional form depends on whether individual consumption is above or below the reference
level (which is itself determined by aggregate past consumption). At this stage of the
analysis we need to specify a mechanism that governs switching in consumersprefer-
ences, which in turn depend on their consumption prole with respect to the reference
level. Given the intertemporal dimension of householdsdecisions, accounting for the ex-
pectations of future consumption is paramount. To solve for endogenous (consumption)
regime switching we use the monotone map algorithm that nds xed point in decision
rules (Coleman, 1991).27
As a preliminary step to solve the model, its quasi-linear representation is derived.
In the absence of sector-specic shocks or other forms of heterogeneity, households are
symmetric and make identical consumption-saving decisions. Therefore, the equilibrium
conditions and the policy reaction function can be linearized in the neighborhood of the
steady state consistent with C=X = 1:28
25Section E in the online appendix reports additional exercises under an instrument rule according to
which the Central Bank adjusts the policy rate in response to both the ination rate and the output term.
The qualitative and quantitative predictions of the model are not a¤ected by this type of extension.
26In the remainder variables without time subscript will denote the steady state values of their time-
indexed counterparts.
27The problem we tackle is isomorphic to the preemptive policy behavior examined by Davig and
Leeper (2008). To initialize the algorithm, we start from the solution of the framework without loss-
averse preferences, but also check that the nal solution is not sensitive to initial conditions by pertubating
these intitial conditions. The nal solution is invariant to perturbating the initial rules, which suggests
that the solution is locally unique.
28The di¤erence between the logarithm of a generic variable Zt and that of its steady state counterpart
Z is denoted by zt. We also assume, without loss of generality, logarithmic consumption utility. For
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yt = 1
 
Ett+1; t

Etyt+1 + 2
 
Ett+1; t

yt 1   3
 
Ett+1; t

(it   Ett+1) ;(11)
t = Ett+1 +  1
 
Ett+1; t

yt +  2
 
Ett+1; t

yt 1   "' 1 (1 + ) zt; (12)
it = rt + t: (13)
In every period the model can generate four states, depending on whether Ett+1 =
f1; 0g and t = f1; 0g. Therefore, we deal with a Markov Switching Rational Expectations
(MSRE) model (see Davig and Leeper, 2007 and Farmer, Waggoner and Zha, 2008, 2009).
As such, some of the parameters in the equations describing the private sectors behavior
depend on the state of the economy and the probability of switching across di¤erent states
is endogenously determined. In addition, the process of (rational) expectation formation
necessarily accounts for the presence of switching across di¤erent consumption regimes.
The solution is a function that maps the minimum set of state variables, t = (zt; t; yt 1),
into values for the endogenous variables, so that the rules for output and ination can be
expressed as hy (zt; t; yt 1) = yt and h
 (zt; t; yt 1) = t.
29
5 The Asymmetric Transmission of Monetary Policy
This section discusses the key mechanisms at work in the model and shows how di¤erent
types of asymmetry can be generated in connection with the transmission of monetary
policy.
5.1 Some Qualitative Insights
Embedding loss-averse preferences over consumption in a general equilibrium setting in-
duces two major modications in the equations accounting for the dynamics of real ac-
tivity and prices. First, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is state-dependent,
being higher (lower) in contraction (expansion). Second, the state-dependent marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure dampens the impact of real activity
on rmsprice-setting behavior during contractions. The rst property has been widely
explored and validated by Yogo (2008). The second property is intimately connected with
the role of loss-averse preferences in a general equilibrium setting. A globally convex ag-
gregate supply function can be envisaged in this context, which retains the property to be
steeper (atter) during expansionary (contractionary) episodes. Similar functional forms
have been explored in the literature on the Phillips curve, emphasizing the role of large
further details, see Section B in the online appendix, where we report the linearized conditions for each
of the four consumption regimes.
29Section C in the online appendix reports additional details on the solution of the state-dependent
model with endogenous switching.
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shocks relative to small ones for rmsprice-setting behavior.30 In this respect, the exis-
tence of menu costs can rationalize a convex aggregate supply schedule. Nonetheless, it
is interesting to note that introducing loss-averse preferences in a general equilibrium set-
ting allows us to provide a microfoundation that emphasizes the role of state-dependent
degrees of real rigidity in the labor market equilibrium allocation, rather than nominal
rigidities. Equation (7) accounts for the dynamics of labor supply: its key property is
to be steeper at levels of total hours above the reference consumption/production point.
Figure 4 portrays this function against a perfectly elastic labor demand. The two sched-
ules intersect at V (C) = V (X). Starting from this point, a contraction in labor demand
induces a larger (smaller) drop in equilibrium employment (wage), as compared with the
responses induced by an equally-sized upward shift in the labor demand schedule. There-
fore, the model generates downward real wage rigidity during contractionary episodes
due to higher intratemporal substitutability between leisure and consumption opportu-
nities,31 and not from asymmetric wage-setting frictions a¤ecting the labor market (as
in Kim and Ruge-Murcia, 2009 and Benigno and Ricci, 2011). As such, this mechanism
marks the key di¤erence between our framework and traditional Keynesian theories of
macroeconomic uctuations, which rather emphasize the inuence of nominal and real
rigidities on the shape of the labor demand schedule.
Insert Figure 4 here
To elaborate further on these intuitions, the linearized relationships describing the
behavior of demand and supply in di¤erent consumption regimes are inspected. In this
context, expectation formation is non-trivial, as agents in the model economy do not know
the realization of all future regimes. In turn, this sequence depends on the sequence of
exogenous shocks that are realized and the serial correlation properties of those shocks.32
However, to provide a simple intuition of how output and ination respond to a monetary
policy shock over di¤erent cyclical phases, it is temporarily assumed that agents naively
expect the economy to permanently stay in either expansion or contraction. Furthermore,
 is set to zero, so that households consider the deviation of their consumption utility
from the utility accruing from a constant reference level of consumption. This amounts
to implicitly look at cyclical variations in output rather than expansions/contractions in
the business cycle. These simplifying assumptions allow us to highlight the main struc-
tural di¤erences between the state-dependent model with loss aversion and the standard
30See Laxton et al. (1999) for a review of the literature and the analysis of the monetary policy
implications of assuming a convex aggregate supply.
31It should be noted that the degree of asymmetric reaction increases in the labor supply elasticity.
In fact, at low levels of 1= the state-dependent marginal consumption utility exerts a weak impact on
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, which is instead dominated by the
marginal utility of leisure. In the limit (i.e., 1= ! 0) the income e¤ect tends to fully compensate the
substitution e¤ect from a wage increase and the resulting labor supply function is close to anaelastic.
32Section C in the online appendix shows how to compute time-varying probabilities of regime switch-
ing.
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New Keynesian setting. However, analogous implications carry over to the model with
endogenous switching across consumption regimes, as we detail in the next section. Table
2 reports the state-dependent IS schedule and the NKPC.
Insert Table 2 here
Assuming loss-averse consumers implies state-dependent degrees of real rigidity and
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption that generate competing e¤ects
in the responses of output and ination to monetary innovations. Specically, during
contractions the IS schedule displays higher elasticity of current consumption to the real
rate of interest.33 As to the state-dependent NKPC, the elasticity of ination to output
deviations from its steady state level is higher in expansions. This results from the
labor supply schedule being convex, which induces a dampened response of rmsreal
marginal cost with respect to consumption when the latter lies below its reference point.
Therefore, during contractions greater responsiveness of output to the real interest rate
is counteracted by a attening of the NKPC. The ultimate impact of a monetary policy
shock on ination depends on the relative magnitude of these competing forces.
5.2 Quantitative Analysis
To quantify the asymmetric impact of monetary policy over contractions and expansions,
we compute the solution of the quasi-linear model economy. To this end, the model
is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. The discount factor  = 0:99. The inverse of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, , is set to 0:25.34 As to householdsconsumption
preferences,  = 0:5 and  = 0:9. The literature on dynamic general equilibrium models
does not provide us with any empirical reference on the coe¢ cient that indexes the degree
of loss aversion. Therefore,  is set to 2:25, in accordance with Tversky and Kahneman
(1992). In line with Yogo (2008),  = 1. Nominal rigidity in price-setting is such that, on
average, prices remain unchanged for three quarters. As to the policy reaction function,
r = 1:5, while the non-systematic component t = t 1 + 

t , where  = 0:5 and
t
i:i:d: N (0; 0:02). As to the process governing the technology shock, zt = zzt 1 + zt ,
where z = 0:9 and 
z
t
i:i:d: N (0; 0:06).35
33According to this mechanism, loss-averse consumption preferences should also be able to generate
empirically relevant asymmetries in the transmission of scal shocks. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012, 2013) show that the e¤ects of a government spending shock on output are signicantly larger and
more persistent when the economy is characterized by underutilization of resources, as compared with a
situation of full capacity.
34Recall that  measures the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor with respect to hours worked.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) report evidence of low values of this elasticity, generally between 0.25
and 0.4, while McCallum (2001) suggests values closer to the lower bound.
35We assume higher volatility in the innovations to the technology process, so as to make it possible
to generate contractionary and expansionary episodes that are predominantly driven by real rather than
monetary innovations.
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Insert Figure 5 here
A quantitative assessment of the asymmetric impact of monetary innovations is an
obvious goal for this study. To this end, contractions and expansions are generated by
perturbating the system with a technology shock of the appropriate sign. Concurrently,
a monetary policy shock is induced whose magnitude is not large enough to reverse the
cyclical movement in output,36 so that it is not the Central Bank to determine the regime
in place at any given point in time. Therefore, policy interventions are only "modest" in
their scope (Leeper and Zha, 2003). Finally, the response to the technology shock is sub-
tracted from the overall response of the system to both sources of exogenous perturbation,
so as to isolate the e¤ect of monetary innovations. Figure 5 displays greater reactiveness
of output to monetary shocks during contractions as opposed to expansions a result in
line with the arguments of Section 5.1 which conrms the robustness of the mechanism
at work in generating asymmetric responses of real activity over positive and negative
growth cycles. Otherwise, the di¤erence between ination responses over di¤erent stages
of the cycle is negligible, suggesting that higher (lower) responsiveness of real activity in
contractions (expansions) is attenuated (amplied) once output movements are passed
through onto prices.
Insert Figure 6 here
It is certainly important to assess the behavior of the model in response to sources
of uctuations other than monetary shocks, so as to highlight the distinctive features of
contractionary and expansionary output movements. In this respect, the model displays
elements of business cycle asymmetry that have been extensively documented, among
others, by Neftci (1984), Hamilton (1989), Sichel (1993) and, more recently, Morley and
Piger (2012). Figure 6 portrays equilibrium dynamics in response to positive and nega-
tive technology shocks of di¤ering signs and magnitudes. In line with the evidence on the
e¤ects of monetary innovations, an adverse supply shock induces a deeper contraction,
as compared with the reaction to an equally-sized expansionary shock (i.e., troughs are
deeper than peaks are tall). Concurrently, contractionary movements tend to display
higher steepness as compared with expansionary movements, given that in the rst case
output deviations from the steady state take longer to peter out. To investigate these
properties in further detail, we implement a battery of asymmetry tests that aim at quan-
tifying the statistical signicance of deepness and steepness in the simulated business cycle
series, conditional on di¤erent sources of exogenous disturbance. The results reported in
Table 3 conrm that cyclical movements in the output series are manifestly asymmetric,
with statistical evidence of both deepness and steepness. Moreover, deepness is primarily
36Monetary innovations are generated so as to induce a monetary tightening (loosening) during ex-
pansions (contractions). This is coherent with the empirical evidence of Romer and Romer (1994), who
show that the Fed funds rate tends to decline (rise) right after the cyclical peak (trough).
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driven by monetary policy innovations, rather than by technology shocks. The intuition
for this result is that monetary innovations induce greater deviations of the ex-ante real
rate of interest from its steady state level, as compared with technology shocks, which
make the nominal rate of interest and the rate of ination move in the same direction.
As a result, the non-linear mechanism of switching across di¤erent consumption regimes
is magnied in the face of monetary policy innovations.
Insert Table 3 here
Insert Figure 7 here
Unlike models based on exogenous mechanisms of switching across di¤erent states,
our framework can generate non-linear responses to shocks with opposite signs and mag-
nitudes. A vast empirical evidence has shown that monetary policy induces asymmetric
responses of output and prices not only with respect to the economic conditions, but also
depending on the size and direction of the policy action. A wide consensus has been
reached on the view that money a¤ects output strongly when monetary policy is restric-
tive, whereas it exerts little or no e¤ect when it is expansive (Cover, 1992; Morgan, 1993;
Dufrenot et al., 2004). Otherwise, the e¤ect on prices is nearly symmetric (Karras and
Stokes, 1999; Weise, 1999). There is also some evidence that shocks of di¤erent magni-
tudes have asymmetric e¤ects on output. Weise (1999) shows that if the economy starts
in a low-growth state, large negative shocks induce substantially larger contractionary
(on impact) responses in output, though on a longer time horizon no asymmetry can be
appreciated with respect to the size of the shock. It is possible to show that our model can
account for empirically relevant non-linearities in the transmission of monetary shocks
with opposite signs. Figure 7 shows how monetary contractions cause greater e¤ects on
output, as compared with the impact induced by positive monetary shocks of the same
size. By contrast, ination displays nearly symmetric responses. This can be intuitively
explained by the fact that a rise in the nominal rate of interest increases the chances to
trigger or deepen contractionary output movements, as compared with a loose monetary
stance.37 This is consistent with the evidence reported by Garcia and Schaller (2002),
who show that an increase in the nominal rate of interest raises the probability of moving
from an expansion to a recession. Similarly, an interest rate cut is typically associated
with a higher probability of getting out of a recession.
6 Optimal Monetary Policy
Once it is recognized that loss aversion induces various types of asymmetry in the trans-
mission of shocks to the economy, it becomes manifest that the policy maker should take
37Concurrently, a non-linear labor supply schedule implies an attenuation of the pass-through from
output to ination during a contractionary stage of the cycle.
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account of these facts. To this end, we derive the optimal monetary policy from the per-
spective of the Ramsey planner. Prior to set up the normative analysis, it is important
to recall that there are two distortions a¤ecting the model economy, namely nominal
rigidity in price-setting and external habits in consumption. The presence of nominal
rigidities would not per se be a problem in the presence of technology disturbances, as
the monetary authority may always ensure that the e¢ cient allocation is replicated, even
in the presence of internal habits (see Amato and Laubach, 2004 and Leith et al., 2012).
However when habits are external, such that one household does not take account of the
impact their consumption has on the utility of others, then with one policy instrument
available the monetary authority cannot simultaneously ensure output is at its e¢ cient
level and ination is eliminated. Therefore, monetary policy faces an explicit trade-o¤
when seeking to minimize the joint e¤ect of these two distortions. If the monetary au-
thority can credibly commit to following its policy plans, it then chooses the policy that
maximizes householdswelfare subject to the equilibrium relationships that describe the
competitive economy. The Lagrangian representation of the Ramsey problem reads as:
max
fCt;Xt;Nt;Rt;tg1t=0
min
f1;t;2;t;3;t;4;tg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t

U (Ct; Xtj t)  
N1+t
1 + 

+1;t
"
1
Rt
  UC
 
Ct+1; Xt+1j t+1

t+1UC (Ct; Xtj t)
#
+2;t

(1 + ) (1  ") + " N

t
ZtUC (Ct; Xtj t)
  't (t   1) + 'Mt;t+1t+1 (t+1   1) Zt+1Nt+1
ZtNt

+3;t
h
ZtNt   Ct   '
2
(t   1)2 ZtNt
i
+4;t

Xt   Ct 1
	
; (14)
where i;t, i = 1; 2; 3; 4 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraints.
Specically, the rst constraint is represented by the consumption Euler equation, the
second one is the prot maximization condition, the third one is the aggregate resource
constraint, while the fourth constraint accounts for the stock of consumption habits. After
deriving the rst order necessary conditions for the Lagrangian problem,38 equilibrium
dynamics is examined by linearizing the model in the neighborhood of the steady state.
To this end, we set  = [1  (1  ) "] ("  1) 1. This value for the subsidy replicates
the social planners steady state allocation by compensating for the net e¤ect of the habits
externality and the distortion due to imperfect competition.39
The implications of implementing the optimal policy under commitment are exam-
ined in terms of impulse responses to the technology shock. We rst consider the simplest
38For further details, see Section D in the online appendix.
39To avoid time-consistency problems and in line with the timeless perspective approach to optimal
policy-making we set the time-zero value of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the price-setting
equation at its (Ramsey) steady state level. Section D in the online appendix shows this value is zero.
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scenario, in which consumers weigh their own consumption level with respect to an exoge-
nous reference level (see Figure 8a, where  = 0). This is done to isolate the role of loss
aversion from the consumption externality due to external habit formation. In this case
price rigidity is the only distortion the Central Bank is confronted with. Under these cir-
cumstances the rate of ination may be fully stabilized (and so the output gap is closed),
regardless of the sign of the technology shock. However, the policy response necessarily
changes between contractions and expansions. Recall that the NKPC is relatively atter
during contractionary episodes. As a result, the policy maker tolerates a deeper output
drop in this case, so as to stabilize ination and the output gap. This property holds
despite consumption is more responsive to interest rate changes during negative growth
cycles. This result emphasizes the role of state-dependent non-linearities in the NKPC
for the sake of monetary policy-making.
Insert Figure 8 here
The picture changes when external consumption habits are accounted for (see Figure
8b). To see why, it is useful to recall the di¤erent determinants of monetary policy
responses in a linear model with external (supercial) habits, as that envisaged by Leith,
Moldovan, and Rossi (2012). In this context nominal inertia points to a loosening of policy
in the face of a positive technology shock so as to boost output while the consumption
externality stemming from external habit formation suggests that higher consumption
entailed by the expansionary policy need not be desirable. In our model these incentives
assume di¤erent weights depending on whether the shock induces a contraction or an
expansion. On a priori grounds the net e¤ect on the policy rate is not unambiguous,
as during contractions loss averse preferences induce both a attening of the NKPC and
a stronger consumption externality. In this respect, a striking implication of assuming
the presence of external habits is that not only ination cannot be stabilized, but it also
drops in the face of an adverse shock to technology. This property holds even though the
Central Bank responds with a monetary tightening, thus attaching greater importance to
price-setting distortions, as compared with consumption externalities. This result may be
explained as follows. The negative shock shifts the aggregate supply backward. Due to
the monetary tightening, also aggregate demand contracts. At this stage of the analysis
we need to consider a key departure from the description of Figure 8a. In that case the
monetary authority was only concerned with the distortion arising from price stickiness.
The co-existence of endogenous habits in consumption and loss aversion now imposes
the Central Bank to weigh the detrimental e¤ects that a contractionary policy would
induce in terms of declining real activity. This translates into a relatively more elastic
aggregate demand, as compared with the one we appreciate during expansionary phases.
As a result, a downward shift of the demand schedule tends to predominantly reect into
a drop of the ination rate, ceteris paribus.
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7 Concluding Remarks
A vast empirical evidence shows that output and prices react asymmetrically to monetary
policy innovations over contractionary and expansionary phases of the business cycle. It
is a well-established nding that monetary policy has stronger e¤ects on the GDP during
contractions, as compared with expansions. As to price responses, these are not statis-
tically di¤erent across di¤erent stages of the cycle. This paper shows that embedding
prospect theory into an otherwise standard dynamic general equilibrium model may ra-
tionalize these facts. Loss-averse consumption preferences imply state-dependent degrees
of real rigidity and elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption that generate
competing e¤ects on the responses of output and ination following a monetary innova-
tion. The qualitative and quantitative analyses return predictions that are in line with the
empirical evidence. Output responses to a monetary tightening are greater in contractions
as compared with expansions. Despite the amplication of output responses, downward
wage rigidity induced by loss-averse preferences tends to attenuate ination responses
during negative growth cycles. As a consequence, we cannot detect statistically relevant
di¤erences in ination responses over alternative cyclical phases. In addition, the model
can successfully reproduce empirically relevant non-linearities in the reaction of output
and ination to monetary innovations with opposite signs. A rise in the nominal rate of
interest increases the chances to trigger or deepen a contractionary movement in output,
as compared with a loose monetary stance. Therefore, unexpected monetary contractions
have greater e¤ects on output, as compared with the impact induced by positive shocks
of the same absolute size. By contrast, ination displays nearly symmetric responses.
In this context the optimal monetary policy under Ramsey planning imposes to weigh
the distortion stemming from price rigidity with the one induced by external habits in
consumption. Importantly, loss averse preferences enhance the consumption externality
during contractions, so that the Central Bank is challenged with a state-dependent policy
trade-o¤.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. Phillips curve regressions
SPF Ination Forecasts OLS IV
0  0:5447  0:5504
(0:0790) (0:0828)
1 0:2307
 0:2470
(0:0432) (0:0486)
2  0:1475  0:1759
(0:0815) (0:1037)
EWMA Ination Forecasts OLS IV
0  0:4957  0:5078
(0:0670) (0:0697)
1 0:3109
 0:3315
(0:0366) (0:0410)
2  0:1441  0:1693
(0:0691) (0:0873)
Notes. P-values in parentheses. ***/**/* denote statistical signicance at the 1%/5%/10% level,
respectively.
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Table 2. State-dependent model under naiveexpectations.
Expansion (Ett+1 = t = 1) Contraction (Ett+1 = t = 0)
IS yt = Etyt+1   (1 + (1  ) ) 1 (it   Ett+1) yt = Etyt+1    (  (1  ) ) 1 (it   Ett+1)
NKPC t = Ett+1 +  ( + 1 + (1  ) ) yt    (1 + ) zt t = Ett+1 +  1 ( (1 + )   (1  )) yt    (1 + ) zt
Notes. The coe¢ cient  equals "' 1.
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Table 3. Tests for asymmetry of the cycle.
Skew (eyt) Skew (eyt)
Technology and Monetary Shocks
 0:1838
[0:00010]
 0:2789
[0:00005]
Technology Shocks
 0:1894
[0:00011]
 0:2831
[0:00005]
Monetary Policy Shocks
 0:5232
[0:00008]
 0:2468
[0:00005]
Notes. Table 3 reports some tests for asymmetry in the cyclical behavior of the simulated output
series, conditional on di¤erent shock congurations. The rst column reports the skewness of detrended
output (a measure of deepness), whereas the second column reports the skewness of the growth rate of
detrended output (a measure of steepness). Standard deviations are reported in square brackets. All
statistics are signicant at the 1% level.
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Figure 1. Responses to a monetary tightening: contractions vs. expansions.
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Notes. The green (light) line graphs the responses to a monetary tightening during an expansionary
regime, while the blue (dark) line is associated with a contractionary regime. The dotted lines are one
standard deviation condence intervals.
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Figure 2. Real wage during contractions.
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Notes. Figure 2 graphs the output gap (continuous line), the real wage (dotted line), and the real wage
in deviation from its HP(1600) trend (dashed line) during contractions (in percentage points).
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Figure 3. Reference-dependent preferences.
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Notes. Gain-loss function (LHS panel) and its rst-order derivative (RHS panel), for  = 1 and di¤erent
values of .
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Figure 4. Labor market under alternative preferences.
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Notes. The red-dashed-dotted line corresponds to the labor demand schedule; the blue-continuous line
is the labor supply schedule under loss-averse preferences ( = 0:5), while the blue-dashed line is the
labor supply schedule under standard neoclassical preferences ( = 1). We set  = 0:25,  = 1 and
 = 2:25.
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Figure 5 Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in di¤erent cyclical phases.
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Notes. The continuous line denotes the response to a (one standard deviation) negative monetary shock
during a contractionary regime; the dashed line denotes the response to a (one standard deviation) posi-
tive monetary shock during an expansionary regime. To obtain these responses, we preliminary generate
contractions and expansions by perturbating the system with a (one standard deviation) technology
shock of the appropriate sign. Concurrently, we induce a (one standard deviation) monetary policy
shock. Finally, we subtract the reaction to the technology shock from the overall response of the system
to both sources of exogenous perturbation, so as to isolate the e¤ects of monetary innovations.
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Figure 6. Impulse responses to technology shocks of di¤erent signs and magnitudes.
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Notes. We portray equilibrium dynamics in response to positive and negative technology shocks of
di¤erent magnitudes, specically: 1.5 standard deviation (continuous line), 1 standard deviation (dashed
line), 0.5 standard deviation (dotted line). The green (light) line is associated with a positive technology
shock, while the blue (dark) line is associated with a negative technology shock.
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Figure 7. Responses to monetary policy innovations.
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Notes. The blue-continuous line portrays cumulative responses to monetary policy innovations, while
the green-dashed line accounts for impact responses. The magnitude of the monetary policy innovation
is measured over the x-axis.
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Figure 8. Optimal monetary policy
Figure 8a. Optimal monetary policy with no endogenous consumption habits
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Figure 8b. Optimal monetary policy with external consumption habits
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Notes. We portray equilibrium dynamics in response to positive and negative technology shocks under the
optimal commitment policy. The green (light) line is associated with a positive technology shock, while
the blue (dark) line is associated with a negative disturbance. We consider three di¤erent magnitudes
for the technology shock: 1.5 standard deviation (continuous line), 1 standard deviation (dashed line),
0.5 standard deviation (dotted line). Figure 8a is obtained by excluding endogenous external habits
from households preferences ( = 0), while Figure 8b obtains under the baseline parameterization
( = 0:9).
39
Technical Appendix
Appendix A: Contractions and Expansions in the U.S. Business
Cycle
Figure A1. Turning points in the U.S. business cycle.
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1
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
-5
0
5
Notes. Upper panel: the blue (continuous) line represents the output gap, the green (dashed) line is a
centered Moving Average (MA) of the output gap, the red (dotted) line is a Band Pass (BP) ltered log-
real GDP. Bottom panel: transition probabilities corresponding to the two ltered series. Recessionary
episodes as identied by the NBER are denoted by the vertical bands. We set { = 12 to account for
the speed of regime switching. The results are robust to alternative values of this coe¢ cient.
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Figure A2. Responses to a monetary tightening: contractions vs. expansions
Contractions/expansions indicator: MA ltered log-real GDP.
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Notes. The green (light) line graphs the responses to a monetary tightening during an expansionary
regime, while the blue (dark) line is associated with a contractionary regime. The dotted lines are one
standard deviation condence intervals.
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Figure A3. Responses to a monetary tightening: contractions vs. expansions.
Contractions/expansions indicator: BP ltered log-real GDP (one period-lagged indicator).
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Notes. The green (light) line graphs the responses to a monetary tightening during an expansionary
regime, while the blue (dark) line is associated with a contractionary regime. The dotted lines are one
standard deviation condence intervals.
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Appendix B: Log-linear State-Dependent System
This appendix reports the model linearized around the non-stochastic steady state. For
clarity of exposition, we present the equations describing private sectors behavior in each
of the four possible states depending on consumption dynamics.
The IS Curve
We linearize the Euler equation in the neighborhood of the steady state consistent with
C=X = 1, obtaining the following state-dependent system of linearized IS curves:
yt =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1+(1 )
1+(1 )(1+)Etyt+1 +
(1 )
1+(1 )(1+)yt 1   it Ett+11+(1 )(1+) i¤ Ett+1 = t = 1
1 (1 ) 

1+(1 )(1  )
Etyt+1 +
(1 )
1+(1 )(1  )
yt 1   it Ett+11+(1 )(1  ) i¤ Ett+1 = 0; t = 1
1+(1 )
1 (1 )( 1 )
Etyt+1   (1 )



1 (1 )( 1 )
yt 1   it Ett+11 (1 )( 1 ) i¤ Ett+1 = 1; t = 0
1 (1 ) 

1 (1 )(1+) 

Etyt+1   (1 )


1 (1 )(1+) 

yt 1   it Ett+11 (1 )(1+) 

i¤ Ett+1 = t = 0
where we have aggregated across individuals (imposing homogeneity) and used the goods
market clearing condition, Yt = Ct.
When it comes to linearize the model economy in the neighborhood of C=X = 1,
it is important to note that G
0
(Z) presents an ordinary double point at Z = 0. As
such, G
0
(Z) is not purely di¤erentiable in that point, as also implied by property (i).
Therefore, standard linear approximation techniques such as the Taylor expansion do not
immediately apply in this case. However, we can resort to a rst-order approximation of
G
0
(Z) by computing an a¢ ne global underestimator, thus determining the subgradients of
the marginal utility function at Z = 0. A subgradient determines a support hyperplane to
the graph of the function under scrutiny. In such a case the corresponding subdi¤erential
is a direct generalization of the di¤erentiable case. For a convex and non necessarily
di¤erentiable function f : Rn ! R, the subdi¤erential at x0 is dened as @f (x0) =
fg 2 R : f (x)  f (x0) + hg; x  x0ig. Thus, g 2 f (x0) is subgradient in x0.40 In our
case it is straightforward to note that at Z = 0 there will be a single subgradient for
each branch of the function under scrutiny. To gain intuition on this, we can re-write
the marginal utility as G
0
(Z) = min

G
0
A(Z); G
0
B(Z)
	
for Z 2 R, where G0A(Z) and
G
0
B(Z) are the functions that encompass the arms of marginal utility corresponding to
Z > 0 and Z < 0, respectively: These functions are both convex. It is also easy to
see that G
0
B(Z) > G
0
A(Z) for Z 2 R+ and G0B(Z) < G0A(Z) for Z 2 R . Hence, our
40See Hiriart-Urruty and Lemaréchal (2001).
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approach amounts to a piecewise linear approximation in the neighborhood of Z = 0.
Note also that assuming a smooth gain-loss function G(Z) at Z = 0 allows us to obtain a
continuous rst derivative function, which improves the approximation around the point
Z = 0, compared with what would happen, say, with a linear gain-loss function, which
implies a discontinuity at G
0
(0).
Ination Dynamics
After applying some trivial algebra we retrieve a log-linearized expression for the real
marginal cost:
!t =
8><>:
( + 1 + (1  ) ) yt   (1  ) yt 1 i¤ t = 1
 
 + 1  (1  ) 


yt + (1  ) yt 1 otherwise
:
Thus the piecewise linear NKPC reads as:
t = Ett+1 "' 1 (1 + ) zt+"' 1
8><>:
( + 1 + (1  ) ) yt   (1  ) yt 1 i¤ t = 1
 
 + 1  (1  ) 


yt + (1  ) yt 1 otherwise
:
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Appendix C: Model Solution
The solution to the model is a function that maps the minimum set of state variables
into values for the endogenous variables. Implementation of the map algorithm begins
by taking the initial rules for ination and the output gap, h^ (zt; t; yt 1) = t and
h^y (zt; t; yt 1) = yt. We then substitute them, together with the interest rate rule, into
the functions describing private sector behavior, yielding:
yt = 1
 
Ett+1; t

Et
h
h^y
 
zt+1; t+1; yt
i
+ 2
 
Ett+1; t

yt 1
  3
 
Ett+1; t
 
rt + t   Et
h
h^
 
zt+1; t+1; yt
i
; (15)
t = Et
h
h^
 
zt+1; t+1; yt
i
+  1
 
Ett+1; t

yt +  2
 
Ett+1; t

yt 1   "' 1 (1 + ) zt;
(16)
This system translates into:
yt = 1
 
Ett+1; t
 Z bz
az

 
z;2z
 Z b
a

 
;2

h^y (z; ; yt) d dz + 2
 
Ett+1; t

yt 1
  3
 
Ett+1; t
 
rt + t  
Z bz
az

 
z;2z
 Z b
a

 
;2

h^ (z; ; yt) d dz
!
;
(17)
(18)
t = 
Z bz
az

 
z;2z
 Z b
a

 
;2

h^ (z; ; yt) d dz
+  1
 
Ett+1; t

yt +  2
 
Ett+1; t

yt 1   "' 1 (1 + ) zt; (19)
where  () is the normal density, ai =  32i (i = z; ) and bi = 32i (i = z; ). Expec-
tations are evaluated using trapezoid integration. Linear interpolation is then used to
evaluate h^y (zi; k; yt 1) and h^
 (zi; k; yt 1) for i = 1; 2; :::; Nz and k = 1; 2; :::; N, where
Ni (i = z; ) denotes the number of nodes in each shock dimension. The state vector
and the decision rules are taken as given when solving the system. The system is then
solved for every set of state variables over a discrete partition of the state space. This
procedure is repeated until the iteration improves the current decision rules at any given
state vector by less than some convergence criterion, that we set to 1e-8. Note that to
initialize the algorithm, we start from the solution of the framework without loss-averse
preferences, but also check that the nal solution is not sensitive to initial conditions
by perturbating these initial conditions. The nal solution is invariant with respect to
45
perturbations in the initial rules, suggesting the solution is locally unique.
In this setting, the probability of future regimes can be characterized. For instance,
assume that we are interested in computing the probability that consumption expands
above its reference level in the current period and it is expected to do so even in the next
period. This amounts to compute the probability that shocks that bu¤et the system in
the current period will not cause consumption to fall below the reference level, neither at
time t nor at time t+1, conditional on the information set available at time t. To provide
an example, we rule out monetary policy non-systematic responses, so as to assume that
endogenous switching is not inuenced by monetary policy shocks. In this setting, the
smallest innovation to the supply shock process necessary to induce Ett+1 = t = 1 is
given by the solution to:
min
zt
[f (zt ) ; g (
z
t )] s.t. Etyt+1  yt and yt  yt 1; (20)
where:
f (zt ) = Eth
y
 
z (zzt 1 + 
z
t ) + 
z
t+1; h
y (zzt 1 + 
z
t ; yt 1)

(21)
  hy (zzt 1 + zt ; hy (zt 1; yt 2)) ; (22)
g (zt ) = h
y (zzt 1 + 
z
t ; h
y (zt 1; yt 2))  hy (zt 1; yt 2) : (23)
Therefore, the probability that both Etyt+1  yt and yt  yt 1 is:
Pr

Ett+1 = t = 1
t = Z u
zt

 
z;2z

dz; (24)
where z is a positive truncation point and zt is the solution to the minimization problem.
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Appendix D: Ramsey Optimal Policy
We consider the optimal policy problem (15). The rst order necessary condition with
respect to fRtg1t=0 is:
1;t
R2t
= 0; t = 0; 1; 2; ::: (25)
From this it is immediately evident that 1;t = 0; t = 0; 1; 2; ::: The remaining rst order
conditions are as follows:
Ct : 0 = UC (Ct; Xtj t)  2;t
"Nt UCC (Ct; Xtj t)
Zt [UC (Ct; Xtj t)]2
  2;t'Et
(
UC
 
Ct+1; Xt+1j t+1

UCC (Ct; Xtj t)
[UC (Ct; Xtj t)]2
Zt+1Nt+1
ZtNt
(t+1   1) t+1
)
+ 2;t 1'
UCC (Ct; Xtj t)
UC
 
Ct 1; Xt 1j t 1
 ZtNt
Zt 1Nt 1
(t   1) t   3;t   Et4;t+1C 1t ;
(26)
Xt : 0 = UX (Ct; Xtj t)  2;t
"Nt UCX (Ct; Xtj t)
Zt [UC (Ct; Xtj t)]2
  2;t'Et
(
UC
 
Ct+1; Xt+1j t+1

UCX (Ct; Xtj t)
[UC (Ct; Xtj t)]2
Zt+1Nt+1
ZtNt
(t+1   1) t+1
)
+ 2;t 1'
UCX (Ct; Xtj t)
UC
 
Ct 1; Xt 1j t 1
 ZtNt
Zt 1Nt 1
(t   1) t + 4;t; (27)
Nt : 0 =  Nt + 2;t
"N 1t
ZtUC (Ct; Xtj t)
  2;t'Et
(
UC
 
Ct+1; Xt+1j t+1

UC (Ct; Xtj t)
(t+1   1) t+1Zt+1Nt+1
ZtN2t
)
+ 2;t 1'
UC (Ct; Xtj t)
UC
 
Ct 1; Xt 1j t 1
 Zt
Zt 1Nt 1
(t   1) t + 3;tZt
h
1  '
2
(t   1)2
i
;
(28)
t : 0 =  
"
2;t   2;t 1 UC (Ct; Xtj t)
UC
 
Ct 1; Xt 1j t 1
 ZtNt
Zt 1Nt 1
#
[' (2t   1)]  3;t' (t   1)ZtNt:
(29)
The rst order conditions with respect to the Lagrange multipliers are given by:
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1;t : 0 =
1
Rt
  Et
(
UC
 
Ct+1; Xt+1j t+1

t+1UC (Ct; Xtj t)
)
; (30)
2;t : 0 = (1 + ) (1  ") + " N

t
ZtUC (Ct; Xtj t)
  ' (t   1) t + 'Mt;t+1 (t+1   1) t+1Zt+1Nt+1
ZtNt
; (31)
3;t : 0 = ZtNt   Ct   '
2
(t   1)2 ZtNt; (32)
4;t : 0 = Xt   Ct 1: (33)
Ramsey Steady State
It is immediate to verify that the Ramsey problem leads to the e¢ cient (social planners)
allocation for 1;t = 2;t = 0. Therefore, in the steady state the rst order conditions
(26)-(28) reduce to:
1  3   4 = 0; (34)
  (1  ) + 4 = 0; (35)
 + 3 = 0: (36)
Equations (35) and (36) in this system provide us with a solution for 3 and 4:
3 = ; (37)
4 = 1  : (38)
These can be plugged into (34), so as to nd a value of  that is consistent with the
allocation C = X:
 = 1  (1  ) : (39)
Equation (29) makes it clear that  = 1, so that the steady state counterpart of (31)
implies:
0 = (1 + ) (1  ") + "N

UC
;
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where UC denotes the rst-order derivative of U with respect to Ct, evaluated at the
steady state. Therefore, given (39), we nd a coherent a value for the subsidy:
 =
1  (1  ) "
"  1 :
Note that setting  = 0 amounts to removing external habits and their inherent ex-
ternality associated with consumption uctuations. In this case the subsidy reduces to
1= ("  1), as in the baseline New Keynesian model where the only distortion arises from
monopolistic competition in the goods market.
49
Appendix E: Alternative Monetary Policy Rule
This appendix replicates Figures 5, 6, and 7 in the manuscript under the assumption that
the Central Bank adjusts the policy rate in response to both the rate of ination and the
output term:
Rt
R
=

t

r Yt
Y
rY
exp (t) ; (40)
where we set rY = 0:5, while the other coe¢ cients are set in accordance with the baseline
parameterization:
Figure E1. Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in di¤erent cyclical phases.
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Notes. The continuous line denotes the response to a (one standard deviation) negative monetary shock
during a contractionary regime; the dashed line denotes the response to a (one standard deviation) posi-
tive monetary shock during an expansionary regime. To obtain these responses, we preliminary generate
contractions and expansions by perturbating the system with a (one standard deviation) technology
shock of the appropriate sign. Concurrently, we induce a (one standard deviation) monetary policy
shock. Finally, we subtract the reaction to the technology shock from the overall response of the system
to both sources of exogenous perturbation, so as to isolate the e¤ects of monetary innovations.
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Figure E2. Impulse responses to technology shocks of di¤erent signs and magnitudes.
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Notes. We portray equilibrium dynamics in response to positive and negative technology shocks of
di¤erent magnitudes, specically: 1.5 standard deviation (continuous line), 1 standard deviation (dashed
line), 0.5 standard deviation (dotted line). The green (light) line is associated with a positive technology
shock, while the blue (dark) line is associated with a negative technology shock.
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Figure E3. Responses to monetary policy innovations.
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Notes. The blue-continuous line portrays cumulative responses to monetary policy innovations, while
the green-dashed line accounts for impact responses. The magnitude of the monetary policy innovation
is measured over the x-axis.
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